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CHAPTER 9 
False Convictions 
PHOEBE ELLSWORTH 
SAM GROSS 
False convictions have received a lot of attention in 
recent years. Two-hundred and forty-one prisoners 
have been released after DNA testing has proved their 
innocence, and hundreds of others have been released 
without DNA evidence. We now know quite a bit 
more about false convictions than we did thirty years 
ago-but there is much more that we do not know, 
and may never know. 
Background 
False Convictions and Exonerations 
Conceptually, convicting an innocent person is a 
misclassification, an error caused by the difficulty of 
evaluating uncertain evidence about a past event. Few 
misclassifications, however, are as troubling. A false 
conviction may destroy the life of the innocent de­
fendant and deeply damage the lives of those close 
to him. He is punished as cruelly as the worst among 
us, by the state, in public. He is deprived of the life 
he once led and labeled a criminal, perhaps a vicious 
predator. He knows that he is innocent; he tells the 
truth to the authorities, but they ignore him. And in 
the process they usually make another mistake: they 
fail to pursue the real criminal. 
Historically, the dominant reaction to this problem 
has been denial. Judge Learned Hand expressed this 
view memorably in 1923: "Our [criminal] procedure 
has always been haunted by the ghost of the innocent 
man convicted. It is an unreal dream" ( United States 
v. Garsson, 1923). Judge Hand, of course, knew that 
innocent people are sometimes convicted; his claim 
was that it is so extremely rare that the risk should not 
affect public policy. We still hear echoes of that view, 
but they are increasingly unconvincing. 
The fundamental problem with false convictions is 
that they are extraordinarily hard to detect. By defini­
tion, we do not know when a conviction is wrong, 
or we would not make the error in the first place: if 
we had a general test for innocence, we would use it 
at trial. The same ignorance that causes false convic­
tions makes them exceedingly difficult to study. The 
only ones we know about are exonerations, those rare 
cases in which a convicted criminal defendant is able 
to prove his innocence after the fact. 
A handful of such cases were known when Judge 
Hand wrote in 1923. Nine years later, Edwin Bor­
chard published Convicting the Innocent, his clas­
sic collection of 65 exonerations dating back to the 
nineteenth century (Borchard, 1932). In the decades 
that followed several similar collections were released 
(Frank and Frank, 1957; Gardner, 1952; Gross, 1987; 
Radin, 1964), culminating in Radelet and Bedau's 
compilation of 417 cases of American defendants 
who had been convicted of homicide or of other capi­
tal crimes in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
(Bedau and Radelet, 1987; Radelet, Bedau, and Put­
nam, 1992). 
In the meantime, the rate of exonerations increased 
sharply, first in the mid-1970s, when the death penalty 
came back into use in the United States after a judicial 
hiatus (Furman v. Georgia, 1972; Gregg v. Georgia, 
1976), and then again in 1989 when the first DNA 
exonerations occurred. As a result, there have been 
hundreds of exonerations in the United States in the 
past few decades. They have changed our view of the 
nature of the problem of false conviction and have had 
a substantial impact on the criminal justice system. 
We focus on these recent exonerations, which fall 
into four sets: 
• In January 1989, David Vasquez became the first 
of 241 American defendants to date to be exoner­
ated by DNA evidence (Conners et al., 1996; 
Innocence Project, 2009).1 Almost all of these 
exonerations involve rape, although in some cases 
the defendant was also convicted of another crime, 
usually murder. 
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• Since 1973, 135 defendants who were sentenced 
to death for murder have been exonerated and 
released. DNA evidence played a substantial role 
in 17 of these death-row exonerations ( Death 
Penalty Information Center, 2009). 
• From 1989 through 2003, at least 135 American 
defendants who were convicted of felonies but 
not sentenced to death were exonerated without 
the benefit of DNA evidence. Unlike the DNA 
and death-row exonerations, there is no authori­
tative list of such cases. The vast majority were 
from convictions for murder (78%) or rape (12%) 
(Gross et al., 2005). 
• In the past ten years, between 140 and 200 in­
nocent defendants were released in mass exonera­
tions when three major police scandals came to 
light: two in Texas, in 2002 and 2003, and one 
in Los Angeles, in 1999. In each of these sets of 
cases, police officers were caught systematically 
framing innocent defendants for possession of il­
legal drugs or weapons (Gross, 2008) .2 
There have been other exonerations since 1973, but 
these four groups include the great majority of those 
that have been described in publicly available sys­
tematic collections. It is a small set of observations, 
perhaps 650 to 700 exonerations across the whole 
country over a 35-year period. It is not much to go 
on, but it is a lot more information than we had in 
1990. 
Before we proceed to what we have learned from 
these several hundred exonerations, we should say a 
few words about what we do not know. 
First, since there is no test for the actual innocence 
of convicted defendants, we rely on a proxy: the ac­
tions of government officials when claims of inno­
cence are raised. As we use the term, exoneration is 
an official act-a pardon, a dismissal or an acquittal­
declaring a defendant not guilty of a crime for which 
he or she had been convicted, because new evidence 
of innocence that was not presented at trial required 
reconsideration of the case (Gross et al., 2005 ). 
Some exonerated defendants are no doubt guilty 
of the crimes for which they were convicted, in whole 
or in part, but the number is probably very small. It 
is extremely difficult to obtain this sort of relief after 
a criminal conviction in America, and it usually re­
quires overwhelming evidence. On the other hand, it 
is clear that countless false convictions are never dis­
covered. That is true for entire categories of cases, as 
we will see, and even among cases where exonerations 
do sometimes occur, they frequently depend on blind 
luck.3 
Second, we know next to nothing about false con­
victions for any crimes except rape and murder. These 
two crimes-the most serious violent felonies­
account for only 2% of felony convictions (and a much 
smaller proportion of all criminal convictions), but 
95% of exonerations. The main reason is simple. Since 
almost all exonerations require large investments of 
scarce resources, they are only actively pursued in the 
most serious of cases. The 340 defendants who were 
exonerated and released from 1989 through 2003 
spent, on average, more than 10 years in prison. Most 
had been sentenced to death or life imprisonment, 
and more than three-quarters to at least 25 years in 
prison (Gross et al., 2005). By comparison, 30% of all 
convicted felons in 2004 were not incarcerated at all, 
and the average term for those who were was just over 
3 years (Durose and Langan, 2007). 
The disproportionate attention to the most extreme 
cases explains the comparatively high number of ex­
onerations among murder convictions, and especially 
death sentences. For rape, of course, the availability 
of DNA evidence has made exonerations much more 
accessible and common than for other serious violent 
felonies, for example, armed robbery. Even so, rape 
exonerations generally occur in the cases with the most 
severe sentences. Of 121 rape defendants exonerated 
from 1989 through 2003, over 30% were sentenced 
to life imprisonment, and the median sentence for the 
remainder was 30 years; for all defendants convicted of 
rape in 2000, 10% received probation, and the median 
sentence for the rest was 7 years (Gross, 2008). 
What mistaken convictions have we left out? Of 
course we do not know, but we can make some edu­
cated guesses. For example, the number of wrongful 
convictions for robbery must be far greater than the 
few that have been discovered. Almost all wrongful 
convictions in rape cases involve eyewitness misiden­
tifications, which are largely limited to cases in which 
the criminal is a stranger to the victim, but robberies 
by strangers outnumber rapes by strangers by a factor 
of 10 or more (Gross et al., 2005). In a study con­
ducted before the advent of DNA testing, most of the 
comparatively few eyewitness misidentification cases 
that led to exonerations were robberies, not rapes 
(Gross, 1987). It stands to reason that false convic­
tions for robbery still outnumber those for rape, but 
very few of them show up among the exonerations 
because there is no definitive evidence of innocence 
that is comparable to DNA. 
Base rates suggest that most false convictions prob­
ably occur among the two overlapping groups that 
dominate all criminal convictions: ( 1) Comparatively 
light sentences, typically for comparatively minor 
charges. As we have seen, such cases are all but entirely 
missing from exonerations. (2) Guilty pleas. Over 95% 
of criminal convictions in America are based on guilty 
pleas, usually as a result of plea bargains-but only 
about 6% of exonerations are of defendants who pied 
guilty, and they are more similar to other exonerations 
than to guilty pleas in general. The average sentence 
for 20 defendants who pied guilty and were later exon­
erated between 1989 and 2003 was 46 years in prison, 
which is not surprising given that all but one were 
charged with rape or murder and all faced the death 
penalty or life imprisonment (Gross et al., 2005). 
Here again, we have scraps of relevant informa­
tion, enough to disprove the common belief that 
innocent defendants virtually never plead guilty to 
crimes they did not commit (Hoffman, 2007). We 
know about false convictions for illegal possession of 
drugs and guns in the context of the mass exonera­
tions that followed the discoveries of three systematic 
schemes by police officers to frame innocent defen­
dants. Most of these defendants pied guilty in return 
for sentences far lighter than those that might warrant 
the cost and work that are usually required to have 
a chance at an individual exoneration (Gross, 2008). 
But how often do innocent defendants plead guilty in 
order to receive light sentences in other, more com­
mon contexts? And in what sorts of cases? We don't 
have a clue. 
The Frequency of False Convictions 
AB recently as 2007, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote 
in a concurring opinion in the Supreme Court that 
American criminal convictions have an "error rate 
of .027 percent-or, to put it another way, a success 
rate of 99.973 percent" (Kansas v. Marsh, 2006). A 
highly comforting assessment, if true-but of course, 
it is absurd. The error was derived by taking the num­
ber of exonerations we know about-almost all of 
which occur in a tiny minority of murders and aggra­
vated rapes-and dividing it by the total of all felony 
convictions, from drug possession and burglary to car 
theft and income-tax evasion. To actually estimate the 
proportion of erroneous convictions, we need a well­
defined group of cases within which we can identify 
all mistaken convictions, or at least a substantial pro­
portion of them. It is hard to imagine how that might 
be done for criminal conviction generally; however, it 
may be possible to do so, at least roughly, for the two 
types of crimes for which exonerations are compara­
tively common: rape and capital murder.4 
For rape, there are some systematic data (not 
yet analyzed) on false convictions. In Virginia, the 
Department of Forensic Science has discovered hun­
dreds of files on rape cases from the 1970s and 1980s 
with untested biological evidence that could be used 
to obtain DNA profiles of the rapists. A careful study 
of this DNA archive, or of similar sets of files else­
where, could produce a good estimate of the rate of 
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false convictions for rape in that jurisdiction for the 
decade or so before pretrial DNA testing became rou­
tine. So far, all we have are the results of a preliminary 
run in Virginia: 2 false convictions out of 22 cases, or 
9% of that tiny sample (Liptak, 2008). 
Capital murder is different. It stands out from 
other crimes not because of any special evidentiary 
advantage in determining whether convictions were 
in error, but because far more attention and resources 
are devoted to death-penalty cases, before and after 
conviction. AB a result, death sentences, which repre­
sent less than one-tenth of 1 % of prison sentences, ac­
counted for about 22% of the exonerations from 1979 
through 2003, a disproportion of more than 250 to 1 
(Gross and O'Brien, 2008). This suggests that a sub­
stantial proportion of innocent defendants who are 
sentenced to death are ultimately exonerated, perhaps 
a majority. If so, the rate of capital exoneration can 
be used as a lower bound for the rate of false con­
viction among death sentences. Gross and O'Brien 
(2008) calculated that 2.3% of all death sentences in 
the United States from 1973 through 1989 ended 
in exoneration (86/3792), and Risinger (2007) esti­
mated that 3.3% of the defendants sentenced to death 
for rape murders from 1982 through 1989 were ex­
onerated by DNA evidence; but as the researchers 
note, even among death sentences, the true propor­
tion of false convictions must be higher than the ob­
served proportion of exonerations, perhaps consider­
ably higher. 5 
Can we generalize from the false-conviction rate 
for death sentences? One might suppose that the 
error rate for other crimes is likely to be at least as 
high, considering that fewer resources are devoted to 
less serious cases. On the other hand, Gross (1998) 
argued that the error rate for murder in general, and 
capital murder in particular, is likely to be greater than 
for other felonies because the authorities are under 
enormous pressure to solve these heinous crimes. As 
a result they sometimes pursue weak cases that would 
otherwise be dropped, cut corners, or rely on ques­
tionable evidence. Unfortunately, there are no data 
on this point one way or the other. What we do know 
is that among the most serious criminal convictions of 
all-deatl1 sentences-miscarriages of justice are, at a 
minimum, an uncommon but regular occurrence, like 
death from diabetes ( 3 .1 % of all deaths in the United 
States) or Alzheimer's disease (2.8%) (Heron, 2007). 
Causes and Predictors of False Convictions 
Several evidentiary and procedural factors recur among 
exonerations: eyewitness misidentification, false con­
fession, fraud and error on the part of forensic analysts, 
perjury by jailhouse informants and other witnesses 
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who testify in exchange for substantial favors, miscon­
duct by police and prosecutors, and incompetent rep­
resentation by criminal defense attorneys. All of these 
factors have been examined by social scientists and 
legal researchers, some extensively. 
Eyewitness error is the most common cause of 
false convictions. It occurs in most known cases (Gar­
rett, 2008; Gross et al., 2005), and it is the one most 
thoroughly researched. Many factors that can mini­
mize the likelihood of eyewitness error are within 
the control of the police ( system variables, as Wells 
called them [1978]): obtaining an immediate detailed 
description of the suspect from the witness; careful 
choice of lineup members; instructions that caution 
the witness that the true culprit may not be in the 
lineup; presentation of the lineup by a person who 
does not know who the actual suspect is; carefully 
recording the content and timing of all communica­
tions between the police and the witness; and scrupu­
lous refusal to communicate any information about 
the suspect to the witness. Laboratory studies have 
demonstrated that all of these factors and others can 
affect the testimony of the witness and the chances 
of misidentification (cf. Steblay and Loftus, this vol­
ume). Case studies confirm that these are the most 
common causes of error in false convictions that have 
come to light (e.g., McGonigle and Emily, 2008). 
Approximately 250 false confessions have been re­
ported since the late 1980s (Leo, 2008), and Garrett 
(2008) reported that they occurred in 15% of the cases 
of prisoners exonerated by DNA evidence. A series of 
laboratory studies by Saul Kassin demonstrates that 
ordinary people can be induced to confess to wrong­
doing much more easily than is commonly believed, 
that tactics often used in police interrogations ( such as 
lying about incriminating evidence) can increase the 
likelihood of false confessions, and that trained police 
investigators are not very good at distinguishing true 
confessions from false ones (Kassin, 2005). There is 
strong evidence from actual cases that suspects who 
are young or mentally impaired are particularly vul­
nerable to suggestive police tactics that encourage 
false confessions (Leo, 2009). Although the empirical 
record on false confessions is less extensive than it is 
for eyewitness misidentification, we know a good deal 
about the kinds of tactics that elicit false confessions, 
( Kassin, 2008), and prohibiting these tactics would 
certainly reduce their frequency. 
Forensic error (Garrett and Neufeld, 2009), per­
jury by informants (Warden, 2004), and prosecuto­
rial (Armstrong and Possley, 1999) and ineffective 
defense work (Scheck, Neufeld, and Dwyer, 2003) 
are not so subject to controlled experimentation but 
have frequently been found in cases of actual false 
convictions. Some of these problems are caused by 
overtaxed resources and heavy caseloads and might 
be solved by spending more money. But not all. For 
example, forensic labs that are run by police depart­
ments are less likely to conduct unbiased analyses than 
fully independent labs no matter how well funded. 
And prosecutorial misconduct that leads to newswor­
thy convictions is unlikely to be punished. 
There is no doubt that all these factors contrib­
ute to many, probably most, false convictions. Most 
innocent defendants who were misidentified; for 
example, would not have been convicted if no eye­
witness had identified them. But information from 
exonerations alone is limited, even when it is rein­
forced by the results of controlled experimental stud­
ies. Experimental studies have identified factors that 
lead to evidentiary mistakes (misidentifications, false 
confessions), and these mistakes frequently occur in 
known false convictions (e.g., Scheck, Neufeld, and 
Dwyer, 2003). But experimental studies cannot tell 
us which mistakes are most important for false convic­
tions because they do not measure false convictions. 
It appears, for example, that many-probably most­
misidentifications (Gross, 1987) and false confessions 
(Drizin and Leo, 2004) do not lead to the conviction 
of innocent people. To really understand the signifi­
cance of these factors we need to know more about 
the investigatory and adjudicative processes that pro­
duce false convictions. 
First, we only know about the causes of those false 
convictions that we know about. As we have seen, 
that means that any generalizations we mal<e are ef­
fectively limited to rape and murder cases that go to 
trial. For example, some defendants who cannot af­
ford to post bail are offered the choice of taking plea 
bargains and going home on probation or insisting on 
their innocence and remaining in jail. That dilemma 
may be a major cause of false convictions for innocent 
defendants who plead guilty ( see, e.g., PBS, 2004, the 
Erma Faye Stewart case), but we have no data with 
which to test that hypothesis. And the false convic­
tions that are produced by this process may involve 
the same evidentiary and procedural factors we have 
discussed-or they may not: many of these cases are 
decided on slight evidence with little procedure. 
Second, the occurrence of one of these causal ele­
ments is rarely a sufficient description of the process 
that led to a wrongful conviction. For example, when 
an innocent defendant falsely confesses after 20 hours 
of intensive interrogation, we must ask, Why did the 
police believe he was guilty and invest so much time in 
wringing a confession out of him? And why did they 
trust a confession obtained under these circumstances? 
Third, while these factors are causes of false con­
viction, they are not predictors. For example, eyewit­
ness misidentification appears to be the most com­
mon cause of wrongful rape convictions, occurring in 
nearly 90% of rape exonerations. But what does that 
really tell us? With a handful of exceptions, all rape 
exonerations so far have occurred in cases in which 
there was no pretrial DNA testing. In these cases, the 
victim was expected to identify the defendant, unless 
it was physically impossible because it was dark or her 
face was covered. If she failed to do so, the case usu­
ally fizzled. In other words, before DNA evidence, 
an eyewitness identification was all but essential for a 
rape case to be prosecuted at all. If all rape convictions 
involve eyewitness identification, then all rape exon­
erations necessarily involve misidentification. But if 
we can only infer the misidentification on the basis of 
the exoneration, the misidentification could not have 
been used as a predictor of innocence. 
What about police procedures that might cause an 
eyewitness to pick the wrong person? Experimental 
studies demonstrate that misidentifications can easily 
be caused by suggestive identification procedures: a 
police officer who knows which of the subjects in a 
lineup is the real suspect may intentionally or uninten­
tionally make that person salient to the witness in sub­
tle or obvious ways; or a witness may be called to the 
police station and shown a person in handcuffs who 
vaguely resembles that witness's description of the 
criminal; or a witness who repeatedly fails to identify 
the suspect's picture in different photographic lineups 
may eventually pick him because of a cumulative sense 
of familiarity ( Steblay and Loftus, this volume). 
But do suggestive identification procedures predict 
false convictions? That is not so clear. Suggestive tac­
tics may be pervasive, whereas false convictions are 
rare. For all we know, suggestive tactics are used just 
as often in accurate identifications as in mistaken iden­
tifications. We know from experimental research that 
suggestive tactics increase the number of mistaken 
identifications, but suggestive identification tech­
niques can also lead to true convictions. They may 
be as likely to provide the impetus that motivates an 
irresolute witness to declare an accurate choice as they 
are to produce an inaccurate one. 
The same logic applies to other common eviden­
tiary causes of false convictions. For example, as with 
misidentification, we know that a confession is false 
only after the fact, when other evidence has estab­
lished the defendant's innocence. And as with sugges­
tive identification procedures, prolonged and gruel­
ing interrogation-or controversial techniques, such 
as falsely telling the suspect that there is incriminating 
eyewitness or fingerprint evidence, or suggesting that 
the reason he has no memory of the crime is that he 
may have blacked out-might be as likely or more 
likely to elicit confessions from guilty suspects as from 
innocent ones. 
To identify actual predictors of false conviction we 
need information about factors that can be observed 
in advance, before we know whether a conviction is 
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true or false. And we need that information not only 
for exonerations but also for some comparable set of 
true convictions as well. For the most part, such data 
do not exist, but a few patterns are clear enough to 
be apparent from comparisons between data on exon­
erations and statistics on rape and murder convictions 
in general. ( 1) Innocent African American men are 
more likely to be falsely convicted of rape than inno­
cent white men, especially if the victim is white, prob­
ably because white Americans are much more likely 
to mistake one African American stranger for another 
than to confuse members of their own race (Meissner 
and Brigham, 2001). (2) Innocent teenagers accused 
of murder are more likely to falsely confess than are 
innocent adults. (3) Minority juveniles are more likely 
than white juveniles to be falsely convicted of rape or 
murder (Gross et al., 2005). 
For death sentences, it is possible to make direct 
comparisons between true and false convictions be­
cause the available records (while far from perfect) are 
much more complete than for other criminal convic­
tions. Gross and O'Brien (2008) compared death­
row exonerations to a sample of executed capital de­
fendants, with the assumption that almost all of those 
who were executed were guilty. They found that false 
capital convictions are more likely ( 4) if the defendant 
had little or no prior criminal record, ( 5) if the defen­
dant did not confess, and ( 6) if the police investiga­
tion took a long time. 
Social and Institutional Context 
Overview 
The common image of a false conviction is derived 
from the murder and rape exonerations that we know 
about: after a difficult and troubled investigation, an 
innocent defendant is convicted at trial for a heinous 
crime of violence and sentenced to death or life in 
prison. There is every reason to believe that few false 
convictions bear any resemblance to this picture. 
Ninety-eight percent of felony convictions, and a 
larger proportion of all criminal convictions, are for 
lesser crimes, mostly property crimes, drug crimes, 
and assaults. Ninety-five percent of felony convictions 
are based on guilty pleas, usually after perfunctory in­
vestigations. In that mundane context, false convic­
tions are not dramatic errors caused by recklessness 
or serious misconduct but rather are commonplace 
events: inconspicuous mistakes in routine criminal 
cases that never get anything close to the level of at­
tention that sometimes leads to exonerations. 
What is more, even the most disturbing false con­
victions may have ordinary histories (Lofquist, 2001). 
Consider the case of Antonio Beaver. In 1996 a white 
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woman was the victim of a carjacking in St. Louis 
( Innocence Project, 2009). She described the crimi­
nal as a black man wearing a baseball cap with a gap 
between his front teeth and helped the policed draw a 
composite sketch. Beaver was picked up a week later 
because he resembled the composite: he had chipped 
teeth. He was placed in a lineup with three other men, 
where he was one of two men in the lineup wear­
ing a baseball cap and the only one with visible den­
tal defects. He was picked by the victim, convicted 
at trial-even though his fingerprints did not match 
those on the rear view mirror of the victim's car-and 
sentenced to 18 years in prison. Beaver was exoner­
ated by DNA in 2007, after serving more than 10 
years, because the victim wounded the real criminal 
with a screwdriver and he bled on the car seat. The 
actual robber was identified by his DNA and finger­
prints; he was serving time for other crimes. 
We tend to think that causes should be propor­
tional to their consequences (Ross and Nisbett, 
1991 ), so when a terrible disaster strikes, we search 
for a cause as dramatic as the tragedy that followed. 
That instinct is often false. After the Challenger space 
shuttle exploded in 1986, the official investigation 
concluded that the immediate cause was a decision by 
NASA managers-under bureaucratic and budgetary 
pressure-to proceed with the launch and override 
warnings from engineers of a potentially catastrophic 
risk. But as Vaughan (1996) demonstrated, there was 
nothing unusual about the launch decision. The man­
agers decided to carry on in the face of a known dan­
ger, with the concurrence of the engineers, as they 
had on many other occasions. They broke no rules 
and followed the established practices of an organiza­
tion in which it was common to classify some risks 
as "acceptable." Similar patterns of routine behavior 
may cause most false convictions, big and small. 
This sort of everyday behavior was probably be­
hind Antonio Beaver's tragedy. The lineup was ob­
viously biased, but casual and suggestive lineups are 
common, perhaps the rule. Most likely, they only in­
frequently lead to false convictions. In many, if not 
most, cases the police do have the right guy; if they 
do not, the witness may not pick the innocent suspect 
despite the suggestive procedure, or the real criminal 
may turn up with the victim's wallet in his pocket, or 
the false suspect may have an iron-dad alibi (e.g., he 
was in jail at the time of the crime). In Beaver's case, 
the police ignored physical evidence from the scene­
fingerprints from an unidentified person and DNA 
that was not tested for a decade-but that, too, is 
commonplace and usually harmless. The upshot was a 
case that drew no attention: a black man who claimed 
to be innocent was convicted of aggravated robbery 
on the basis of a single cross-racial identification at 
an imperfect lineup. Most such defendants are guilty, 
and when they are not, we almost never find out. 
Beaver lucked out: the real robber bled on the car 
seat, the car was recovered, and a blood swab was col­
lected and preserved. 
We are not suggesting that nothing can be done 
about false convictions. Common practices can and 
often should be changed. But there are costs, and 
choosing the most effective reforms is not easy, es­
pecially when there is so little information about the 
underlying problem. 
The Structure of Criminal Investigation and 
Adjudication 
Criminal cases in America proceed through several 
stages. 
IDENTIFYING THE CRIMINAL 
The first task in any criminal investigation is to iden­
tify the criminal. This can take any amount of time 
or none at all. At one extreme, identification may be 
instantaneous (as when a killer reports a homicide and 
confesses) or it may precede the crime: in a sting, for 
example, the suspect is identified before the crime is 
committed. At the other end of the continuum, some 
criminals-like the notorious Zodiac Killer, who ter­
rorized northern California in the late 1960s-are 
never identified. However long it takes, at this stage 
the authorities are still trying to answer the question, 
Who did it? The answer, whenever it comes, marks a 
fundamental shift in focus: from an investigation of 
the crime to the pursuit and prosecution of the sus­
pect; from figuring out what happened to building a 
case against the person who they believe did it. 
ARREST AND CHARGING 
Once the criminal is identified he must be appre­
hended and arrested. This usually happens soon after 
identification, but occasionally a suspect may remain 
at large for a long time, or forever. Arrest triggers 
another set of changes. Typically, this is the point at 
which a prosecutor first learns about the crime. (In 
a minority of cases prosecutors are involved earlier, 
either because the crime is unusually conspicuous or 
because the arrest is the product of a proactive in­
vestigation rather than an after-the-fact response to a 
reported crime.) The prosecutor decides what charges 
to file, if any, and presents them in court, at which 
point the formal process of American criminal litiga­
tion begins. The case becomes a lawsuit with the pros­
ecutor as plaintiff and the suspect as defendant. The 
defendant appears in court and hears the charges; he 
may be released pending trial, or he may be detained, 
usually because he cannot afford to post bail; and he 
gets a lawyer to defend him, usually an appointed law­
yer paid by the state. The adversarial structure is now 
complete. 
PRETRIAL SORTING 
The next stage of criminal proceedings is often called 
pretrial bargaining, but that is misleading. It sug­
gests that trial is the expected mode of resolving a 
criminal case, which is false. For example, of defen­
dants charged with felonies in 2002 in the 75 largest 
American counties, only 4% went to trial whereas 65% 
pled guilty, overwhelmingly to felonies (Cohen and 
Reeves, 2006). Overall, about 95% of all felony con­
victions in the United States are obtained by guilty 
pleas, usually as a result of plea bargaining between 
defense attorneys and prosecutors; in 2002 the pro­
portion of guilty pleas for state-court felonies ranged 
from 68% of murder convictions to 98% of drug pos­
session convictions (Durose and Langan, 2004). In 
some unknown proportion of these guilty pleas, the 
defendants are innocent. 
Plea bargains are not the only cases that end be­
fore trial. Nearly a quarter of all felony cases are dis­
missed by prosecutors, usually because they do not 
have enough evidence to get convictions in court 
(Durose and Langan, 2003). Some of these dismissals 
(again, we do not know how many) happen to benefit 
innocent defendants. In other cases, the charges are 
dropped before trial because of affirmative evidence 
of innocence. Judging from two studies that focus on 
specific causes of false convictions, an innocent defen­
dant who is arrested is more likely to be discovered 
and let go before trial than to be acquitted at trial or 
exonerated after conviction. Gross (1987) collected 
data on 60 misidentification cases in the United States 
from 1967 through 1983; in 35 cases, the charges 
were dismissed before trial, and in 25, the defendants 
were exonerated after conviction at trial; there were 
no acquittals. And Drizin and Leo ( 2004) reported on 
125 suspects who falsely confessed to felonies (over­
whelmingly to murder) between 1971 and 2002: 10 
were arrested but never charged, 64 had their charges 
dismissed before trial, 7 were acquitted at trial, and 44 
were exonerated after conviction. 
TRIAL 
Trials are uncommon among criminal cases in America 
but are heavily overrepresented among exonerations: 
they account for about 5% of felony convictions but 
94% of the exonerations we know about, a dispropor­
tion of more than 350 to 1. Trials are more frequent 
FALSE CONVICTIONS • 169 
for the crimes that account for the great majority of 
exonerations-murder (32%) and rape (16%) (Durose 
and Langan, 2004)-but those charges may be more 
likely to produce exonerations in part because they 
are more likely to go to trial. The common image of 
an American criminal trial includes a jury, but about 
60% are conducted by judges sitting alone. Either 
way, 80%-90% of felony defendants who go to trial 
are convicted. 
Trial, of course, is a highly formal and adversarial 
affair. It is a show run by lawyers, and in criminal 
cases the dominant lawyer is the prosecutor, the of­
ficial who represents the state, decides whether to file 
charges and for what crime, makes the plea offer that 
usually determines whether a case goes to trial or ends 
in a plea bargain, and, if a case does go to trial, pre­
sents the evidence gathered by the police. A prosecu­
tor is legally and ethically bound to "seek justice," and 
in particular to avoid convicting the innocent, but her 
main role at trial is more concrete. Like the defense 
attorney (who has no general obligation to the cause 
of justice), she is an advocate whose goal is to win. 
Both sides are expected to follow the rules of ethics 
and procedure, but within those forgiving limits, their 
job is to present evidence and argument and to un­
dercut their opponents' evidence in whatever manner 
seems most likely to succeed. 
REVIEW 
After trial, a convicted defendant may appeal, but the 
review he will get is limited. The basic form of review, 
direct appeal, is generally restricted to claims that the 
lower court committed procedural error. New evi­
dence may not be presented. The appellate court may 
only consider evidence that was presented at trial and 
may not reevaluate the factual accuracy of the judg­
ment of the judge or jury. Its sole role is to decide 
whether there were procedural errors at trial that were 
serious enough to require trying the case over again.6 
Appellate courts reach that conclusion in only a small 
fraction of criminal appeals, perhaps 5%-7% ( Davis, 
1982; Scalia, 2001 ). Despite the formal rules, there is 
a wealth of anecdotal evidence that judges are more 
likely to reverse a criminal conviction on "procedural" 
grounds if they have doubts about the defendant's 
guilt (Davis, 1982; Mathieson and Gross, 2004), but 
the effect on defendants who actually are innocent, 
if any, may not be large. Garrett (2008) looked at a 
sample of 121 noncapital DNA exonerations that had 
produced written opinions on appeal at some earlier 
stage of review. He found a comparatively high rever­
sal rate, 9%, but it was essentially the same as the re­
versal rate for a matched group of noncapital murder 
and rape appeals, 10%, and, whatever the comparison, 
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91 % of these innocent defendants had lost their 
appeals.7 
Almost all exonerations occur outside the struc­
ture of direct appeal. Appellate review is not designed 
to deal with new evidence (Davis, 1982), and in most 
cases, the exonerating facts are discovered only years 
after the appeals have run their course. At that point 
the defendant may file a petition for discretionary ex­
traordinary relief, asking a court to reopen his case in 
light of the newly discovered evidence, or he may ask 
the prosecutor to join him in such a petition and then 
dismiss the charges, or he may apply to the governor 
for a pardon. All of these options require substantial 
resources that are rarely available, since criminal de­
fendants, who are almost always poor, have no right 
to appointed counsel after their direct appeal. 
Obtaining relief on a claim of factual innocence is 
very difficult. The structure of appellate review in our 
legal culture reflects a deep reluctance to reconsider 
trial-court verdicts even in the light of substantial 
new evidence of error, a bias that is often justified by 
reference to the high value we place on the finality 
of judgments. In many cases a posttrial investigation 
has so thoroughly undermined a criminal conviction 
that it is clear that the defendant would be acquitted 
at a new trial, but no court is willing to exercise its 
discretion to reexamine the original conviction (see, 
e.g., Wells and Leo, 2008, describing the notorious 
Norfolk Four cases). 
Other systems of appellate review may be more 
forgiving. In civil-law countries on the European con­
tinent the search for factual accuracy is considered 
an ongoing process, from trial through appeal. New 
evidence may be considered on appeal, trial witnesses 
may be recalled to provide additional testimony, and 
the factual conclusions of the trial court may be re­
considered and revised ( Damaska, 1986). We do not 
know whether this more open system of review is 
more successful at identifying miscarriages of justice 
at trial.8 
Wrongful Convictions and the Adversary System 
False accusations occur in all legal systems, and all 
legal systems require some means of discovering them 
and preventing them from leading to false convic­
tions. From the time the police identify a person as the 
criminal and make an arrest, the American criminal 
justice system is adversarial. Judges have little power 
to direct the investigation, call witnesses, or ask for 
additional evidence if they feel that what the attorneys 
have presented is ambiguous or incomplete. There 
is no official comparable to the juge d,instruction in 
France, whose sole task is to find the truth by search­
ing for both incriminating and exculpatory evidence. 
Instead, the prosecutor focuses on incriminating evi­
dence, and the defense on exculpatory evidence. 
Proponents of the adversary system argue that 
when each side has a vested interest in finding every 
scrap of evidence that favors its position, the sum of 
the evidence is greater than if a single person inves­
tigated the case (Fuller, 1961; Thibaut and Walker, 
197 5). If the case reaches trial, all of the evidence the 
judge or jury hears is presented by the two adversar­
ies, the prosecutor and the defense attorney. The role 
of the defense attorney is relatively straightforward: 
to get the best possible outcome for the client. The 
prosecutor has a dual role: first to decide whether 
the evidence is sufficient to charge the suspect with 
the crime, and then to organize the information into 
a winning case. Some scholars have argued that the 
motivation to win the case may interfere with the 
motivation to find the truth (Givelber, 2001; Strier, 
1996). There are no useful data on rates or discov­
ery of false convictions in adversarial versus nonad­
versarial legal systems-doubtless both could be im­
proved. But the adversary system is the one we use in 
the United States, and in this section, we will describe 
several of its psychological and structural features that 
may undermine the successful discovery of innocent 
defendants. 
CONFIRMATION BIAS 
When we read news stories about the exoneration of 
innocent people, we are often disturbed by the flimsi­
ness of the evidence that got them convicted in the 
first place. A single eyewitness identifies a man, and 
the case proceeds to trial and conviction even though 
nine coworkers testify that he was on the job fifty 
miles away, and they would be unlikely to make a mis­
take since he was the only black person in the work 
group and "stood out like a raisin in a bowl of rice" 
(the Lenel Geter case, described in Gross, 1987). In 
another case, a boy whose mother had just been mur­
dered was detained for more than 24 hours and grilled 
for 8 hours by interrogators who told him, falsely, that 
he had failed a lie-detector test and that the reason he 
had no memory of committing the crime was that he 
probably blacked out; he came to think it might be 
true and confessed (Connery, 1977, the Peter Reilly 
case). If the evidence in these cases looks so implau­
sible to us, why did the prosecutors believe it? 
In other cases, even after apparently incontrovert­
ible evidence proves that the defendant could not 
have committed the crime (e.g., a time-coded video­
tape shows him somewhere else; Schlup v. Dello, 
1995) or a DNA match shows that the perpetrator 
was someone else (Frisbie and Garrett, 2005, the case 
of Rolando Cruz and Alejandro Hernandez), police 
and prosecutors continue to insist that the men they 
arrested and convicted are guilty. How does this 
happen? 
At some point in every successful case, investiga­
tors must identify a prime suspect and form a theory 
of the case. When this happens, police and prosecu­
tors begin to make a commitment to their theory, 
and they become subject to confirmation bias-the 
tendency to notice, believe, seek, and remember evi­
dence consistent with their theory, while overlook­
ing, doubting, forgetting, and reinterpreting evidence 
to the contrary (Findley and Scott, 2006; Nickerson, 
1998). Confirmation bias is not deliberate miscon­
duct, nor is it the conscious preparation of an ar­
gument designed to persuade a jury. It is a normal 
tendency to construe the world according to one's 
preconceptions, and it has been found in average citi­
zens, students, doctors, accountants, and other pro­
fessionals. In criminal investigations, it can lead the 
investigator to interpret ambiguous evidence as con­
sistent with the prime suspect's guilt, to explain away 
evidence that points to someone else, and to concen­
trate on the suspect when searching for additional evi­
dence. "The prime suspect becomes the only suspect" 
(Tavris and Aronson, 2007, p. 137). As the investiga­
tion proceeds from seeking information to building a 
case, it becomes possible to ignore increasingly pow­
erful indications that the prime suspect is the wrong 
person. 
In a series of experimental studies, O'Brien (2009) 
gave participants a lengthy police file and, after they 
had reviewed the first half of the material, asked half 
of them to write down the name of their prime sus­
pect. The other participants were not asked to state a 
hypothesis. The second half of the file included sev­
eral pieces of information that raised doubts about 
the guilt of the prime suspect, as well as information 
that was consistent with guilt. After reading the entire 
file, participants were given a chance to ask for addi­
tional information. Those who had named a suspect 
were more likely to ask for information focused on 
that suspect rather than other possible suspects and to 
interpret ambiguous or inconsistent evidence so as to 
make it compatible with the suspect's guilt. 
Confirmation bias affects investigators even when 
their sole task is to discover the truth-doctors, scien­
tists, and no doubt, juges d>instruction. But the task 
of the police and prosecutor in an adversary system is 
not so simple and creates contradictory demands that 
exacerbate this bias. As the case proceeds from initial 
investigation to trial, their task shifts from finding the 
truth to building a case against the defendant that will 
persuade a judge or a jury. A persuasive case requires 
a coherent story (Pennington and Hastie, 1992), one 
without loose ends, gaps, or inconsistencies. Thus 
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inconsistencies may be explained away or considered 
too trifling to communicate to the defense attorney or 
the jury, loose ends may be tied up, and in some cases 
gaps may be filled. Confident that they have caught 
the criminal, the authorities may inadvertently exert 
pressure on an eyewitness who is reluctant to make 
an identification or on a lab technician who cannot 
quite reach a conclusion. In the case of a suspect who 
refuses to talk, this pressure may be more intentional. 
O'Brien followed up her studies of confirmation 
bias with a study that examined the effects of this dual 
role. Some participants simply named a suspect, while 
others were put in the role of prosecutors and were 
told that they would later have to persuade people 
that their prime suspect was in fact the criminal. 
Knowing that they would have to convince others 
that they were right led to an even stronger tendency 
to focus exclusively on the prime suspect, to interpret 
ambiguous evidence as consistent with his guilt, and 
to explain away inconsistent evidence. 
FALSE CLAIMS OF INNOCENCE 
As we have said, we do not generally know whether 
a criminal defendant is guilty or innocent-with one 
important qualification. In nearly every case, the de­
fendant knows the truth. This private knowledge ex­
plains the special status we accord to confession, which 
has been called the queen of evidence. It malces it pos­
sible for our system of criminal adjudication to run 
almost exclusively on guilty pleas. And it means that 
innocent defendants can identify themselves to the 
authorities, and they do-all the time. Unfortunately, 
many guilty defendants also say they are innocent. 
Since we have strong reason to believe that the great 
majority of criminal defendants are guilty, true claims 
of innocence get lost in the crowd. 
It is difficult to separate true claims of innocence 
from false ones in any context, but some features of 
the adversarial system make it worse. Once defense 
attorneys enter the picture they stop their clients from 
confessing-or from talking to the authorities at all; 
they take over all communication with the state. In 
that role they are expected to present their clients 
as innocent, if at all possible. But everybody who 
works in the system-prosecutors, police officers and 
judges-knows that this is playacting, that defense at­
torneys rarely believe their clients are innocent. Their 
job is to obtain the best outcomes for their clients, 
acquittal or dismissal if possible, even if the clients are 
guilty, and they usually are. Defense attorneys who 
succeed in saving "obviously guilty" clients from con­
viction are considered stars by their colleagues. 
But what if the defendant really is innocent? The 
defense attorney, faced with dozens of spurious claims 
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of innocence, may not be able to detect the few that 
are true and rarely has the resources to conduct the 
sort of investigation necessary to provide convincing 
evidence. So defense attorneys frequently see their job 
as getting the best deal they can for the defendant 
without worrying too much about actual innocence. 
PREPARATION FOR ADVERSARIAL TRIALS 
We face a similar problem when it comes to present­
ing evidence at trial. We require witnesses to testify 
in public, in the presence of the defendant, following 
strange rules of procedure. To perform this tricky and 
unfamiliar role, a witness requires guidance, prepa­
ration by the lawyer who calls her. Such prepping is 
particularly important because her testimony includes 
cross-examination by an opposing lawyer whose job 
is to discredit her, whether or not she is telling the 
truth. Even truthful witnesses must be taught how 
to look and sound truthful; that is one of a trial at­
torney's most important tasks. 
Adversarial preparation may produce coherent and 
convincing testimony, but it can also undercut accu­
rate evaluation of the evidence at trial. A vague or un­
certain witness is less persuasive than one who answers 
all questions without hesitation (Wells, Lindsay, and 
Ferguson, 1979); therefore, testimony is rehearsed 
and confidence is bolstered, sometimes beyond what 
is warranted. This process is particularly dangerous 
when it begins in the early stages of the investigation. 
The prosecutor and the police officers who work with 
an eyewitness are expected to help the witness identify 
the defendant in court with conviction and clarity. It 
seems in keeping with that role for an officer to tell 
a witness who has just tentatively picked the suspect 
from a lineup-"Congratulations, you got him!"­
but the end result may be a misleadingly confident 
identification in court six months later (Wells and 
Bradfield, 1998). 
So far what we have described is permissible wit­
ness preparation, as our system runs. But if your role 
as a police detective includes helping an eyewitness 
testify effectively, why not help her identify the defen­
dant in the first place? It is a short step from shaping 
the identification testimony that a witness will give in 
court to helping that witness make the identification 
in a precinct station by steering her toward the defen­
dant, especially if the detective has no doubt that the 
defendant is guilty but worries that the witness may 
ruin the case by failing to say so. 
The same logic applies to other police procedures, 
such as interrogation, gathering information from 
snitches, and interpreting forensic evidence. If the po­
lice or prosecutors believe that they already know who 
the criminal is, the purpose of these procedures is not 
to find anything out but instead to produce evidence 
that will convince a judge and jury. Reforms designed 
to protect the innocent will seem misguided to law 
enforcement officials who use these procedures not 
to discover the criminal but to build a case that will 
convict him. If they see the reforms as obstacles to 
convicting the guilty, they are likely to resist them or 
try to circumvent their effects. 
GENERATING FALSE NEGATIVES 
A false positive is the inclusion of an object in a cat­
egory where it does not belong: diagnosing a healthy 
person as depressed or diabetic, for example. A false 
negative is the exclusion of an object from a category 
where it does belong: diagnosing a depressed or dia­
betic person as healthy. In any classification system 
there is a tradeoff between false positives and false 
negatives. Procedures that reduce one type of error 
often increase the other. If there are twelve major 
symptoms of depression-insomnia, loss of interest, 
suicidal tendencies, and so on-a doctor who diag­
noses a patient as depressed if she shows any one of 
the symptoms will mistakenly include many people 
who are not depressed: there will be too many false 
positives. A doctor who requires that a patient exhibit 
all twelve symptoms before prescribing treatment will 
mistakenly miss many people who are seriously de­
pressed: there will be too many false negatives. 
Those who seek to reduce wrongful convictions­
false positives-must recognize that the same reforms 
might also reduce the number of convictions of sus­
pects who are actually guilty. Misleading a suspect into 
believing that he has been identified by an eyewitness 
may cause an innocent person to make a false confes­
sion, but at least as often it may cause a guilty person 
to give up and confess the truth, thereby increasing 
the probability of an accurate conviction. Many of the 
proposed reforms may make all convictions more dif­
ficult to accomplish, not just convictions of innocent 
people. 
Some innovations increase the identification of 
the innocent without diminishing the identification 
of the guilty-scientifically conducted DNA analysis 
is the shining example-but for most there is likely 
to be a tradeoff. Not even the excellent safeguards 
against suggestive lineup procedures proposed by 
the American Psychology-Law Society (Wells et al., 
1998) are immune from this problem. These recom­
mendations include blind lineups, informing the wit­
ness that the culprit might not be there, and fairly 
constructed lineups. But they could cause a hesitant 
but accurate witness to fail to identify a suspect, even 
though the same witness might have made the identi­
fication if suggestive procedures had been employed. 
For a few reforms, such as sequential lineups (Wells, 
2006), preliminary evidence indicates that the likeli­
hood of increasing false negatives is small, but so far 
there is little research. 
There are many policy reasons to forbid sugges­
tive identification practices, but we cannot assume 
that an unbiased procedure always leads to the right 
result. If the police actually do know who commit­
ted the crime and can get a witness to identify the 
person, the resulting conviction is a true conviction. 
Videotaping interrogations and lineups is also an ex­
cellent idea, but not foolproof an aggressive defense 
attorney may find pieces of the tape that would shake 
the jury's confidence in the result, whether or not that 
result is accurate. These reforms are important, and 
we endorse them, but they are not cost free. 
The adversary system exacerbates this problem. 
Good defense lawyers will exploit any weaknesses or 
irregularities in the prosecution to cast doubt on the 
guilt of the truly guilty : their job is to generate false 
negatives, as the prosecutors well know. Witnesses 
shown a blind, unbiased lineup may be less confident 
than witnesses shown a biased lineup, may express un­
certainty, or may not identify anyone at all. The de­
fense attorney will make the most of these weaknesses, 
emphasizing the witness's failure to make a confident 
identification. The same is true for other reforms de­
signed to minimize false convictions: the defense will 
use them to cast doubt on the guilt of all defendants. 
Most police and prosecutors prefer to keep their in­
vestigations confidential and resist reform efforts be­
cause they may provide ammunition to the defense. 
An adversary system is a contest, and the search for 
truth is often eclipsed by the desire to win. 
Policy Implications 
Basic Issues 
The most dramatic development in the provision of 
intensive medical care in the past ten years is prob­
ably the use of checklists. The best known is a simple 
form that requires doctors to note that they have 
taken several time-honored steps to prevent infections 
when inserting bloodstream catheters: wash hands, 
clean patient's skin with disinfectant, cover patient 
with sterile drapes, and so forth. In a pilot project in 
Michigan hospitals in 2004 and 2005, the use of this 
checklist decreased the rate of infection by 66% over 3 
months; in 18 months it saved $75 million and more 
than 1,500 lives (Pronovost et al., 2006). It seems 
that the best way to prevent bloodstream infections in 
intensive care units is not a new drug or better equip­
ment but a procedure that greatly increases the odds 
FALSE CONVICTIONS • 173 
that doctors and nurses will do what they are already 
supposed to do. 
Almost every reform we suggest is some version 
of trying to get police, prosecutors, and defense at­
torneys to do what they are already supposed to do. 
But doing that effectively is far more difficult for false 
convictions than for infections. For one thing, we are 
crippled by our ignorance. We know that checklists 
reduce deaths in hospitals because we can observe 
that outcome directly and compare mortality rates 
across different treatment regimes, but (by definition) 
we never recognize false convictions when they occur, 
and we only occasionally discover them later on. For 
example, we have no idea how many innocent de­
fendants plead guilty or which ones do so and under 
what circumstances, so we are unlikely to identify the 
variables that matter. And we cannot learn much from 
field experiments. We might test a plausible technique 
for reducing false guilty pleas, but since we still will 
not be able to tell which defendants are guilty and in­
nocent, we will not know whether it works. 
The fundamental reason for our pervasive ig­
norance is that guilt is a classification based on im­
perfect information. Classifications can be wrong in 
more ways than one. As we have noted, reforms that 
reduce false positives-convicting the innocent­
may increase false negatives-failing to convict the 
guilty. As usual in this area, we can only guess at the 
effects of this tradeoff, but the adversarial nature of 
criminal litigation makes it much more complicated. 
Everybody in an intensive-care unit-doctor, nurse, 
or technician-has the same objectives: the survival 
and health of the patient. In court, the defendant and 
his lawyer do what they can to undermine the work 
of the prosecutor and the police-to get a dismissal 
or an acquittal-whether the defendant is innocent 
or guilty. 
And then there is the question of cost. The 
American medical system is famously well funded. 
It accounts for 16% of our gross domestic product. 
There are, of course, huge problems of inefficiency, 
lack of access, and uneven distribution of medical ser­
vices, but they occur in an overall context of adequate, 
if not excessive, funding. The criminal justice system 
is starved. Few cases get anything like the attention 
they deserve. A plausible reform, like providing tri­
als to 25% of felony defendants, is unattainable, and 
even basic good practice-for example, collecting and 
preserving all physical evidence in all felony cases­
cannot be done on existing budgets.9 
The Production of Evidence 
When the wrong person is arrested, prosecuted, and 
convicted, it usually means that the evidence against 
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him was defective. The most important kinds of evi­
dence for the prosecution are eyewitness testimony 
about what was done and who did it; physical evidence 
such as fingerprints, DNA, or stolen goods; and con­
fessions. Most reforms designed to reduce the num­
ber of false convictions involve improving the collec­
tion, interpretation, and preservation of these kinds 
of evidence. That applies even when the focus seems 
to be elsewhere. For example, careful scrutiny of jail­
house snitches is important, in large part because they 
generally claim to report confessions by defendants, 
and pseudoscientific expertise, such as handwriting 
analysis, can provide dangerously misleading interpre­
tations of critical items of physical evidence. 
To maximize the amount of high-quality evidence, 
investigations should be scrupulous and thorough, 
even when the case against a s�spect already seems 
to be convincing. This is most obvious with regard to 
physical evidence such as fingerprints, blood, semen, 
surveillance tapes, weapons, and other objects related 
to the crime. Many physical traces are ephemeral. 
Rain obliterates footprints, friends carry off incrimi­
nating objects, the scene of the crime is compromised, 
and evidence that could throw light on the crime is 
irretrievably lost. It is crucial that the initial search be 
comprehensive-rather than focused exclusively on 
collecting evidence against the identified suspect­
and the evidence that is collected should be care­
fully preserved for future analysis. If DNA testing of 
critical evidence is possible, it should always be done. 
Forensic testing should be done in laboratories that 
are held to high standards, operate independently 
from police departments, and are regularly monitored 
( National Research Council, 2009). Unfortunately, 
many American crime labs fall far short of this ideal. 
All this will cost money, but it would be money well 
spent since it would increase the likelihood both of 
finding the true criminal in the first place and of dis­
covering mistakes after the fact. 
The use of DNA identification in rape cases il­
lustrates the benefits of careful attention to physical 
evidence. Twenty-five years ago, a rape trial in which 
the defendant claimed to be misidentified was usually 
a battle of credibility: the jury had to decide whose 
story to believe, the victim's or the defendant's. Now, 
if semen is recovered, DNA testing decides most of 
these cases, and they rarely go to trial. And in old 
cases, an innocent man serving time for rape may be 
exonerated, and the real rapist may be identified, by 
comparing the sample to profiles in DNA databases­
but only if semen from the crime scene was collected 
and preserved. In the years to come, new technolo­
gies may extend this scenario to other tests and other 
crimes, if the collection and preservation of the physi­
cal evidence is conscientious. 
In principle, the same logic applies to interroga­
tions, eyewitness testimony, and physical evidence 
that cannot be tested by means as definitive as DNA 
identification. If an interrogation is recorded and the 
recording is preserved, it is easier to tell whether the 
incriminating facts were provided by the suspect or 
by the interrogator. Recording interrogations may re­
duce false confessions because the police will be less 
likely to coerce or mislead the suspect if they know 
that the defense attorney and possibly the judge or 
jury will be able to see how the confession was ob­
tained. If, later on, new evidence suggests that a de­
fendant who was convicted on the basis of a confes­
sion might be innocent, the tape can be reviewed in 
order to reassess the authenticity of the confession. 
In order to eliminate intentional or inadvertent 
suggestive police pressure on eyewitnesses, the offi­
cer who conducts the lineup should not know which 
person is the actual suspect. Several other procedures 
that can improve the accuracy of lineup identifications 
are currently used by some police departments. First, 
the other people in the lineup are chosen on the basis 
of the witness's description of the suspect, making 
sure that the suspect has no identifying feature that 
makes him stand out: a person who did not witness 
the crime but who read the witness's initial descrip­
tion should not be able to pick out the suspect (Doob 
and Kirschenbaum, 1973). Second, the witness is told 
that the criminal may not be in the lineup. Third, as 
soon as the witness has made a choice, she is asked 
how confident she is about that choice (cf. Wells 
et al., 1998) . Fourth, if there are several witnesses, 
they are shown the lineup one at a time, with no in­
formation about how the others responded. All of 
these are good practices, and future technology may 
provide further improvements. For example, it may 
be possible to create a photo lineup on a laptop soon 
after a possible suspect is apprehended and show it to 
witnesses while their memories are still fresh. 
Finally, as with police interrogations, video record­
ing the identification procedures may inhibit police 
bias at the time of the identification and will create 
a record that can be reviewed in case of later doubts 
about its accuracy. Recordings of interrogations and 
identifications will rarely provide evidence as strong as 
a DNA sample, but they are far better than what we 
have now-inconsistent recollections of police, sus­
pects, and witnesses. 
Like extra care in collecting and preserving physi­
cal evidence, these reforms will cost money. There are 
other costs as well. A clear DNA match or mismatch 
does not raise the problem of false negatives, of letting 
guilty people go free. With these less conclusive forms 
of evidence, the very tactics that lead to false convic­
tions may increase the number of true convictions, 
and preventing the police from using these tactics 
will likely reduce the number of true convictions. 
Misleading a guilty suspect about the strength of 
the evidence against him may induce him to confess. 
Directing a witness's attention to the suspect in the 
lineup or urging her to make an identification may 
give her the confidence to identify the guilty person. 
Reporting an ambiguous fingerprint as a clear match 
might provide the extra evidence necessary to secure 
the conviction of the true criminal. 
Recordings of interrogations or lineups may also 
provide powerful ammunition for shrewd defense at­
torneys, who could peruse them for any irregularities 
that may raise questions in the mind of the judge or 
jury, even if these irregularities should seem trivial in 
the context of the whole procedure. That is an in­
evitable consequence of the adversarial system and 
probably the major reason that police so often resist 
proposed reforms. 
Big Cases and Small Cases 
Almost all of the false convictions we know about­
those that end in exoneration-are big cases: murders 
and rapes for which innocent defendants were con­
victed at trial and sentenced to death, life imprison­
ment, or decades behind bars. A case of this scope 
consumes hundreds or thousands of hours of effort 
by police officers and lawyers on both sides. Big cases 
are fertile ground for confirmation bias: there are 
many stages, many pressures, and many opportunities 
for investigators to become committed to their theo­
ries. Perhaps as a result, these cases also frequently in­
volve serious misconduct by the attorneys or the offi­
cers involved. The most common type of government 
misconduct that we know about is the suppression of 
exculpatory evidence (Armstrong and Possley, 1999), 
but some cases include perjury by police officers (for 
example, forensic analysts), procuring perjury by civil­
ian witnesses, and planting physical evidence (Gross 
et al., 2005). When such misconduct is discovered, 
it is rarely punished (Ridolfi, 2007). On the defense 
side, the main failing is incompetence-lawyers who 
do nothing to prepare for trial, never talk to their cli­
ents, or ignore alibi witnesses and exculpatory physical 
evidence. Here, too, the rules are unenforced (Possley 
and Seargeant, 2011 ) . Even egregious neglect rarely 
results in reversals of convictions or sanctions against 
the offending lawyer. 
Addressing the problems of big cases is compara­
tively straightforward, at least in the abstract. They are 
already time-consuming, uncommon, expensive en­
terprises, and it would not take much more time and 
money to do things right. Government misconduct 
and incompetent defense should not be tolerated.10 It 
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would not take a substantial increase in resources to 
collect and preserve physical evidence, conduct care­
ful identification procedures, record interrogations, 
or conduct systematic internal review within prosecu­
tion and police agencies to identify investigative errors 
before trial. O'Brien (2009) found that confirmation 
bias was greatly reduced if the subjects were asked to 
list evidence against, as well as in favor of, their theory 
of the case. Perhaps some version of that procedure 
would reduce false convictions, or a prosecutor or a 
police officer with no other role in the investigation 
could review the case as a devil's advocate, looking for 
unexplored theories and evidence of possible errors 
(see also Findley and Scott, 2006). 
The overwhelming majority of all criminal con­
victions, however, are comparatively small, routine 
cases: guilty pleas after cursory investigations. In the 
usual case, nobody-neither the defense nor the pros­
ecution, and certainly not the court-collects any 
evidence once charges have been filed; as a practical 
matter, the initial police report, however sketchy, 
forms the only factual basis for a negotiated plea 
bargain. Some of these cases may involve affirmative 
misconduct-perjury, intimidation, concealing excul­
patory evidence-but the nearly universal problem is 
simply inattention. An innocent defendant in a small 
case is likely to have two unattractive choices: take a 
bargain and plead guilty or hold out for trial, perhaps 
in pretrial custody, and hope that by then someone 
will come up with evidence of his innocence. 
Inevitably, most false convictions happen in small 
cases, but we very rarely spot them. A global reform 
of plea bargaining in ordinary cases-for example, re­
quiring an independent factual investigation by the 
defense attorney-would involve a basic restructuring 
of the system of criminal litigation and a huge infusion 
of money. Some reform of this sort might be worth 
the cost, but it is unlikely to happen in the foresee­
able future and we do not know enough about false 
convictions in run-of-the-mill cases to know what 
sort of change is most likely to help. Eliminating plea 
bargaining entirely and providing trials to all or most 
defendants is out of reach, and there is no reason to 
believe that doing so would improve the accuracy of 
convictions. The alternative to a guilty plea is usually 
a trial, and the main reason that innocent defendants 
plead guilty is fear that they might be convicted at 
trial and receive much longer sentences. In most cases 
that fear is probably justified. For example, of the 35 
defendants in the Tulia mass exoneration, 8 went to 
trial, were convicted of drug dealing, and received 
sentences that averaged nearly 47 years and ranged up 
to life imprisonment. The other 27 Tulia defendants 
pied guilty: 1 was not sentenced, 11 received some 
combination of probationary terms and fines, and 15 
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were sentenced to terms that averaged about 7 years 
(Gross, 2008). 
Our only suggestion for preventing false convictions 
in comparatively small criminal cases is the most basic 
and amorphous: those who handle such cases should 
remain alert to the possibility that the defendant might 
be innocent. This applies to everyone, from police offi­
cers to judges, but it is especially important for defense 
attorneys, who have unlimited access to the defendants 
and whose job it is to protect them. 
Conclusion 
This chapter began with a famous quotation from 
Judge Learned Hand. As we conclude, it may be in­
structive to read it again, but in the context in which 
it was written ( United States v. Garsson, 1923). The 
question before the court was whether the defendant 
was entitled to see the evidence considered by the 
grand jury that indicted him. Judge Hand held that 
he was not: 
Under our criminal procedure the accused has 
every advantage. While the prosecution is held 
rigidly to the charge, he need not disclose the 
barest outline of his defense. He is immune from 
question or comment on his silence; he cannot be 
convicted when there is the least fair doubt in the 
minds of any one of the twelve. Why in addition 
he should in advance have the whole evidence 
against him to pick over at his leisure, and make 
his defense, fairly or foully, I have never been able 
to see. No doubt grand juries err and indictments 
are calamities to honest men, but we must work 
with human beings and we can correct such er­
rors only at too large a price. Our dangers do not 
lie in too little tenderness to the accused. Our 
procedure has been always haunted by the ghost 
of the innocent man convicted. It is an unreal 
dream. What we need to fear is the archaic for­
malism and the watery sentiment that obstructs, 
delays, and defeats the prosecution of crime. 
In short, procedures that help criminal defendants 
are far more likely to obstruct the conviction of the 
guilty than to protect the innocent. On the specific 
issue that Judge Hand decided, his argument is un­
convincing. In most states, grand jury records are now 
routinely turned over to defendants, along with many 
other types of prosecutorial evidence, with no appar­
ent harm. But the fear that Hand expressed remains a 
basic argument against many possible reforms. 
Sometimes ( as with grand jury records) this re­
action is nothing more than anxiety about change. 
Many police chiefs, for example, complain in advance 
that if they are required to record all station-house 
interrogations, there will be a steep drop off in con­
fessions and convictions; but in jurisdictions where 
this rule is implemented, the police soon switch sides 
and become advocates for recording (Sullivan, 2004). 
On other issues the problem is more complicated. 
In theory, we guarantee every indigent criminal 
defendant an effective legal defense at state expense. 
But if we actually provided high-quality defense in 
every case (and we do not, not nearly), it would be 
harder to get convictions. Defense lawyers who actu­
ally investigate their cases will spot some false charges, 
but more often they will make the state work harder 
to convict the guilty. The state may have to find more 
evidence, do more legal work, and perhaps take more 
cases to trial rather than resolve them with guilty 
pleas. Even if the defense attorneys do not succeed in 
getting acquittals or dismissals for their guilty clients, 
the prosecutors and the police will have less time to 
pursue other criminals. That is Judge Hand's basic 
complaint. 
Extreme versions of this argument are ugly. It 
may be cheap to convict defendants by manufactur­
ing perjured evidence, or there may be no other way 
to nail a murderer you know is guilty, but nobody 
advocates perjury as a policy. On more mundane is­
sues, however-conducting thorough investigations, 
providing effective defense attorneys, disclosing evi­
dence that is unfavorable to the state, there is a serious 
problem. Our criminal justice system cannot possibly 
function as the rules say it is supposed to with the 
funds that we provide. Instead, we take shortcuts, of 
which the most common is plea bargaining, which pa­
pers over all holes in the work that precedes the guilty 
plea. If we actually require our public servants to do 
careful work, many fewer crimes will be prosecuted, 
unless we also greatly increase their budgets. Police 
and prosecutors must be forgiven for not believing 
that any increase in the work demanded of them will 
be matched by an increase in funding. 
There are more than a million felony convictions a 
year in the United States, mostly for property or drug 
offenses, and millions of misdemeanor convictions. 
The sentences most defendants receive are compara­
tively light, but only comparatively. A year in jail is a 
harsh punishment by ordinary standards, and arrest, 
pretrial detention, and criminal conviction are severe 
punishments in themselves even if there is no post­
trial incarceration. The laboratory research on factors 
that increase or decrease false convictions is irrelevant 
to most of these cases. There is often no eyewitness 
other than the arresting officer, no lineup, no formal 
interrogation. In some small cases the suspect is in­
nocent, but our knowledge is so limited that we can 
offer little in the way of recommendation except to 
say that the problem of false convictions in this con­
text is potentially very serious and deserves research. 
Our main suggestion is distressingly vague: everyone 
involved in processing such routine criminals should 
be on the lookout for cases of possible innocence. 
For major crimes, especially the murders and rapes 
that dominate known exonerations, we have men­
tioned a variety of possible reforms throughout this 
chapter. Most are costly, but we believe that they are 
worth the money. We will not achieve accuracy, either 
in identifying and convicting criminals or in protect­
ing innocent suspects, by continuing to give in to our 
penchant for handling criminal investigations and 
prosecutions on the cheap. 
In a world of adequate funding, we would simply 
say that the police and the lawyers should do what 
they are supposed to do and follow the practices we 
and others recommend. In the system that exists, we 
need to set priorities. We see two, and they bracket 
the criminal process: 
First, if the initial investigation by the police is 
careless or incomplete, information is lost forever. 
Physical evidence that is lost or destroyed cannot be 
replaced. An interrogation that is not recorded cannot 
be reconstructed. Eyewitness memory that is altered 
by a suggestive lineup or suggestive questioning can­
not be retrieved. All of these steps happen before any 
defense investigation can possibly begin. That means 
that the state has a critical responsibility to collect and 
preserve physical evidence, record interrogations, and 
conduct and record careful nonsuggestive eyewitness 
identifications. 
Second, we should be less rigid about reopening 
criminal cases after conviction. No legal system can 
function if court judgments are subject to open-ended 
review, but that principle has limits. It is uncommon 
for substantial evidence of innocence to emerge after 
conviction, but when that happens, there is a real 
possibility that the defendant is innocent. The most 
efficient way to limit the harm caused by convict­
ing the innocent is to reconsider convictions with an 
open mind when new evidence calls them into doubt, 
rather than reject the possibility because it is too late. 
Notes 
1. The case of Gary Dodson, who was exonerated in 
Illinois in August 1989 (Connors et al., 1996), is sometimes 
mistakenly described as the first DNA exoneration in the 
United States (e.g., Gross et al., 2005) .  
2 .  Unless we specify that we are discussing mass exonera­
tions, we use the term exoneration to refer to cases of inno­
cent defendants who were released as a result of proceedings 
that affected only their individual cases. 
3. Our definition of exoneration also excludes known 
defendants who are almost certainly innocent but who have 
not been exonerated-frequently because they pled guilty to 
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reduced charges in order to obtain freedom. For example, in 
1978 Terry Harrington and Curtis McGhee were convicted 
of murder in Iowa. In 2003, twenty-five years later, the Iowa 
Supreme Court reversed the convictions because the police 
had concealed evidence about another suspect. By then all 
the key prosecution witnesses had recanted their testimony. 
Both defendants were offered a deal: plead guilty to second­
degree murder and go free. Harrington turned down the 
deal, and charges were later dismissed after the state's star 
witness recanted once more; he was exonerated. NkGhee 
decided to play it safe, took the deal, and was released. He 
does not count as exonerated since the final outcome of his 
case was a conviction, even though he is just as likely to be 
innocent as his codefendant (Gross et al., 2005).  
4 .  Some researchers have attempted to estimate the rate 
of false convictions indirectly. Huff et al. ( 1996) surveyed 
officials who work in the criminal justice system and report 
that the great majority believe that wrongful convictions 
are rare-in the range of 1%. As Gross and O'Brien (2008) 
pointed out, that estimate is just collective guess work-and 
self-serving optimism to boot. Poveda (200 1 )  tried to bal­
ance Huff's low estimate with data from surveys of prisoners, 
about 1 5 %  of whom claim to be innocent, but two unreliable 
and biased estimates are no better than one. Other research­
ers have used statistical models that build on the frequency 
of disagreements on verdicts between trial judges and juries, 
as reflected in surveys of criminal trial judges, to estimate 
that up to 10% of criminal convictions in jury trials are erro­
neous (Gastwirth and Sinclair, 1998; Spencer, 2007) . These 
models, however, do not. 
5. As Gross and O'Brien (2008) pointed out, most 
death-sentenced inmates are removed from death row and 
resentenced to life imprisonment, frequently within a few 
years of conviction, after which they are unlikely to receive 
the extraordinary attention and scrutiny that are devoted to 
reinvestigating and reviewing the cases of prisoners who may 
be put to death. And, of course, some false convictions must 
remain undetected even for defendants who are executed or 
die on death row from other causes. 
6. A defendant who pleads guilty may also have the right 
to appeal, but the appeal is usually limited to procedural is­
sues that concern the entry of the guilty plea or the legality 
of the sentence. 
7. The effect of appellate review may be much greater 
among capital cases, where the rate of reversal of death sen­
tences, if not the underlying convictions, is far higher than 
the reversal rate for any other category of criminal judg­
ments (Liebman et al., 2000) .  If judges are more likely to 
reverse death sentences when they think the defendant may 
be innocent-and there is strong anecdotal evidence to that 
effect-this would mean that most innocent capital defen­
dants are removed from death row for procedural reasons 
even if they are not exonerated. 
8. We are aware of a couple of recent attempts to open 
the process of factual review in adversarial systems of liti­
gation but have insufficient information to evaluate their 
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efficacy: ( 1 )  In 1997, Great Britain, which has an adversar­
ial common-law system that is similar in many respects to 
that in the United States, created a Criminal Cases Review 
Commission, which has the power to investigate complaints 
by prisoners that they were wrongfully convicted and to refer 
claims it deems meritorious to the appellate courts. In its 
first ten years, the courts took action on 3 1 3  referrals from 
the commission and exonerated the defendants in 187 cases, 
68% of those referred (Criminal Cases Review Commission, 
2009 ) .  (2) In 2007, the State of North Carolina created an 
Innocence Inquiry Commission that has some of the fea­
tures of the British Criminal Cases Review Commission 
(North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission, 2009 ) .  
9.  The federal government i s  an exception. The federal 
criminal justice system is far better financed than the state 
systems, from investigative agencies and prosecutors through 
defense attorneys and courts. There are very few exonera­
tions in federal cases, which might in part reflect the impact 
of better funding, but federal cases differ sharply from state 
cases in many other respects as well. For example, federal 
cases account for about 6% of felony convictions and about 
12.5% of prison inmates, but only about 1 .7% of convicted 
murderers are in federal prisons, and murder cases account 
for the majority of all exonerations in the past 30 years. 
10 .  Part of the reason for lax enforcement of the profes­
sional rules against prosecutorial misconduct and defense at­
torney incompetence is the belief by courts and disciplinary 
authorities that defendants are guilty, so no harm, no foul. 
The defendants usually are guilty, but that is no justification 
for ignoring constitutional requirements and rules of profes­
sional conduct. One way or the other, enforcing these rules 
cannot depend on discovering miscarriages of justice. Most 
are never detected, and even when they are, the time lag is so 
long that the offending attorney has probably forgotten all 
about it, or has retired, or died-or become a judge. 
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